Recent initiatives that evaluate the security of physical systems with objects as assets and people as agents -here called Socio-Technical Physical Systems-have limitations: their agent behaviour is too simple, they just estimate feasibility and not the likelihood of attacks, or they do estimate likelihood but on explicitly provided attacks only. We propose a model that can detect and quantify attacks. It has a rich set of agent actions with associated probability and cost. We also propose a threat model, an intruder that can misbehave and that competes with honest agents. The intruder's actions have an associated cost and are constrained to be realistic. We map our model to a probabilistic symbolic model checker and we express templates of security properties in the Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic, thus supporting automatic analysis of security properties. A use case shows the effectiveness of our approach.
not all possible attacks are necessarily feasible: they in fact have costs of execution and probability of success, which are qualities that depend on factors such as time to move from one place to another, effort to act one way instead of another. Our analysis is thus quantitative, making our security properties more interesting because they are expressed in relation to costs and probabilities.
Algarni et al. [18] propose a social engineering schema to describe threats in social networks. The schema covers the environment, the attacker, the trick, and the victims. The environment includes privacy settings, friendship and connections, and the content of user profiles. The attacker has been characterised by its ability to understand the victim, and to develop and perform an attack plan. A trick has been identified by the quality of the attack plan and its suitability to the targeted. The victim user supports socio-psychological factors, personality types, demographics variables, and motivations and drives. Doss and Tejay [19] conduct a study by observing a group of security analysts who detect insider attacks. The goal is to determine how security analysts can use current security detection tools such as log analysis tools and intrusion detection systems to detect insider attacks. This study was conducted based upon the situational research approach from Grounded Theory 1 . Following GT, four categories were created: security monitoring, threat assessment, insider evaluation and goal orientation. The differences on how the groups apply focus of their efforts, their techniques of analyzing activity and different backgrounds can be combined to create an analytical model for detecting insider threats.
To anticipate insider attacks, Greitzer and Hohimer [20] provide a predictive framework that models human behaviors. It integrates cyber data sources, and psychological and motivational factors. The framework adopts functional requirements inspired from the neocortex metaphor. The factors are captured in a hierarchical ontology to interpret employee role, psycho-social, policy violation, and web access patterns.
The limitation of the approaches [18, 19, 20] is that they do not provide any formalization or experimental results. They focus on the high-level strategies for modeling and analyzing security in STPSs.
Meadows and Pavlovic [21] propose a logic framework to reason about permitted and required movements in a physical space, which can be used to analyze security procedures that govern the movement of people. Their procedures define humans controlling hierarchical configurations of physical objects, such as those that arise when we travel, packing our luggage, tickets and documents to satisfy complex security and safety requirements. They propose a logic to analyze the procedures, which they use to show the failure of the shoe-screening policy at airports in preventing people to bring disallowed objects in the security area. Compared to our work, this framework is limited to a qualitative specification. Further, we use templates of the temporal logic to express security policies.
Paja et al. [22] propose a high-level modeling language for STPSs called STS-ml. It is based on UML diagrams that support social, information, and authorization views. Security requirements are generated based on the security needs between sender and requester actors in terms of constraints. The security analysis uses a disjunctive Datalog solver to identify the conflicting authorisations and the violation of security requirements. This work focuses only on four predefined requirements.
Compared to our approach, none of the commented work covers the probability and costs of actions, formalizes STPS, and measure their security level. Moreover, our security analysis is automatic: we use probabilistic model checking and take advantage from the algorithms built within the tool we use.
Formalization
We envisage an STPS as a physical space (e.g., a building) with objects and people. The space is structured in locations (e.g., rooms) accessible via lockable doors. People act in such a space. They lock or unlock doors, enter and exit rooms, manipulate and exchange objects. Each action happens nondeterministically, conditionally, or probabilistically. Executing an action has a cost. In the same space, a malicious entity threatens people's normal workflow.
STPS : Formal Model
A socio-technical physical system S ∈ S is a tuple S = Phy, Obj, Act, Struc . Phy models the space, Obj models objects, Act the actors including the intruder. Struc is a hierarchical structure that describes the relations that exist between the entities of an STPS. This structure describes locations that belong to the building, the doors that connect two locations, the location of actors and objects, and further, the objects that an object contains or that an actor holds.
Physical space. Phy is a building's infrastructure, its locations and the doors connecting these. It relates keys to the doors and tells if a door is locked or not. Formally, Phy is a tuple L, D, key D , locked D , where:
• L is a finite set of locations (with elements l, l ′ , etc.).
• D is a finite set of doors (with elements d, d ′ , etc.).
• key D : D → O is a partial function that returns the object (i.e., the key) that can lock/unlock a door.
key D is defined only on doors that can be locked. (Objects are defined in the next paragraph)
• locked D is a predicate. It is true when a door is locked and false when a door is unlocked.
Objects. An object can be a container (e.g., a safe) and containers are lockable. An object, container or not, can be movable, destroyable, or both. Formally, Obj is a tuple O, attr, key O , locked O , where:
• O is a finite set of objects (with elements o, o ′ , etc.).
• attr : O → 2 {c,m,d} returns the set of attributes of an object, which is a subset of {c, m, d}. Here c stands for be a container, m for being movable, and d for being destroyable.
• key O : O → O is a partial function that returns the object (i.e., the key) that can lock/unlock an object. key O is defined only on objects that are containers which can be locked.
• locked O is a predicate saying whether an object is locked or not.
Actors. Actors have a behaviour which is constructed from basic actions, composed sequentially or by non-deterministic, conditional, or probabilistic choice. We identify one special actor I as the intruder. The main difference between a regular actor and the intruder is that the intruder's behaviour is not restricted by a behavioural specification. Actors' locations, their possessions, the cost of executing actions and the intruder's capabilities are defined later. Formally, Act is a tuple A, I, Σ, bv where:
• A is a finite set of actors (with elements a, a ′ , etc.).
• I ∈ A is the intruder. We use A I as a shorthand for the set A ∪ {I}.
• The finite set of basic actions Σ is defined as follows:
Informally, "MoveTo" means moving through a door from one location to another. "Lock" (resp., "UnLock") means locking (resp., unlocking) a door or a container with a key. "Get" (resp., "Put")
expresses picking an object up from (resp., putting it down in) a container or a location. "Destroy" stands for destroying an object, and "Give" and "Rec" for giving and receiving objects between agents.
• bv A : A → L returns the expression that describes the behaviour of an actor.
L , the language of an actor's behavioral expressions, is generated by the following Backus-Naur rule:
where α is an atomic action in Σ.
Informally, an actor's behavior is built up starting from the basic actions and from a special action
Stop, expressing inaction. Composite actions are built by sequential composition ".", non-deterministic choice "+", probabilistic choice "+ p " (here, p is a probability value), and guarded choice "+ g ". To simplify the semantical descriptions below, we will assume an equivalence relation on behavioral expressions, satisfying at least the following equalities:
The guard g is a contextual condition, questioning, for instance, whether an agent possesses the right key, whether a door is unlocked, or whether an object is movable. Formally, a guard is an expression e in the propositional logic language E defined as follows:
Here, "⊤" is the boolean value 'true', '∧' is conjunction, and '¬' is negation. Structure. The structure describes the hierarchical relations between locations, objects, actors, and the intruder. It links locations by doors, actors to locations, and objects to locations, to an object (the container), an actor or the intruder. The structure takes the form of a tree extended with special edges defining the connections between locations by doors. Formally, Struc is a graph V, E,C , where:
• V = {b} ∪ L ∪ A I ∪ O is the set of vertices, where b is the root that denotes the name of the building;
• V, E is a directed tree with a root node b, an expression e ∈ E in S. Table 1 describes the semantics of the atomic propositions in g. We use S as superscript to describe any function, predicate, or element from S, and we denote by E + the transitive closure of the set of edges E. E + is the smallest set containing E, satisfying: if (u, v) ∈ E + and (v, w) ∈ 
Labelled Transition System
We model the evolution of an STPS by means of a labelled state transition system S, S 0 , ⇒ . Here, S is the set of all STPS states, S 0 ∈ S is a given state that we call the initial state, and for a set of labels Γ, ⇒ ⊆ (S × Γ × S) is the transition relation.
Labels. Labels are tuples of the form
, where Σ ℓ are transition names, R + are costs, and [0, 1] are probability values. The names in Σ ℓ carry the action being executed, the actor (possibly the intruder) as well as the objects and subjects of the action.
The real values in R + denote the cost of the transition. We assume that costs are established by a function Cost : Σ ℓ → R + . Costs depend on all the elements of the transition: the action, the action's subject and its object. So, for instance, the cost of an actor moving from one location to another depends (or may depend) on the actor and on the two locations. In particular, the cost of the intruder opening a door with a key may be different from the cost of opening the door by picking the lock. The probabilistic values denote the probability of the transition. represented by the relevant part of their graphs. The edge labels and the nodes in the graphs express elements of the state that relate to them. We display only those elements that express a condition for the occurrence of the transition or that change due to the transition. Besides, we often simplify the transition label. We omit the cost c, as it is Cost(ℓ) and can be easily retrieved when it evaluates to true, and we omit the probability value when this is 1. This simplification regards all rules, except those expressing guarded (GC) and probabilistic (PC) choices. We present the transition rules of actors in Tables 2, 3 , and 4, and we describe the rules of the intruder in Table 5 .
Actors. Table 2 unlocking of a container. Table 3 shows how an STPS changes because of an actor dropping an object o in the location where he stands (PL), or putting it inside another container which is within the actor's grasp (PO). Symmetrically, rules GO and GL describe the action of picking an object up from an unlocked container or a location, respectively. Rule D describes how the STPS changes after an actor destroys an object. The exchanging rule (EX) expresses synchronization of giving and receiving an object o. As a result, the object becomes possession of the receiving party. In specifications, we will often write Rec(x, a) for
to express that the recipient is willing to receive any object. The cost of an exchange is defined as the sum of the costs of the two synchronized actions, where c denotes the cost of giving and c ′ denotes the cost of receiving the object.
Finally, Table 4 shows the rules for the choice operators, respectively non-deterministic choice (NC), guarded choice (GC) and probabilistic choice (PC). B 1 , B 2 , B ′ 1 , and B ′ 2 are assumed to be behavioural expressions of the same actor. We write a[B] to express a behavior of an actor a in a given state S. Intruder. The intruder is modeled similar to any other actor: he is in a certain room, possibly holding some objects. However, while a regular actor's behavior is described by a behavioral expression, the intruder is not restricted in this way. The capabilities of the intruder are given by means of a set of semantical rules, which describe, for instance, that the intruder can open locks without possession of the key. An example of a set of such semantical intruder rules is given in Table 5 . We consider this particular set of rules as a parameter of our modeling language, which can be replaced by any stronger or weaker intruder model. The rules in Table 5 , describe a more or less realistic, relatively weak, intruder. Rules LD I , UD I , LO I , UO I express that the intruder can lock and unlock doors and containers without possessing the key. Rules S I and T I state that the intruder can steal objects from an agent or slip objects into an agent's pockets. Rules G I and R I describe the situation where the intruder impersonates a regular agent in the exchange of objects. In addition to these intruder-specific activities, the intruder has the same capabilities as those of regular agents (Tables 2 and 3) , such as moving (rule M) and object manipulation (rules PO, PL, GO, GL, D). The intruder variants of these rules are straightforward and will not be displayed.
Clearly, the chosen set of intruder capabilities still has some strong limitations. First of all, the intruder's actions are restricted to the physical infrastructure provided, which means, e.g., that he will have to use doors to move from one location to another, that he needs to be in a room to pick up something from that room and that he cannot move an unmovable object, as he cannot destroy an indestructible object. Second, the intruder is not able to change the physical infrastructure, so he is not able to create new doors or locations. We repeat that these limitations are not based on the assumption that our model should only consider relatively weak adversaries and that the semantics rules can be easily extended. 
Security Analysis

PRISM Program
A PRISM program is a set of modules, each having a countable set of boolean or integer, local, variables. A module's local state is fully defined by the evaluation of its local variables, while the program's global state is defined by the evaluation of all variables.
The behavior of a module is defined by a set of probabilistic commands, of Dirac commands, or both. 
with values val i . The meaning of a probabilistic command is the following: for action a, if the guard g is satisfied, an update u i is enabled with a probability p i . Dirac commands have the form
which means that for a, if the guard g is true, the update u is enabled with probability 1. The action a is a label. The guard is an expression consisting of both local and global variables, and the propositional logic operators. Syntactically, a module M is delimited by two keywords: the module head "module M", and the module termination "endmodule".
We can model costs in PRISM. In a PRISM program, say P, costs (called rewards in PRISM's jargon) are specified in a separate module. Syntactically, a reward module R is delimited by keywords Modules can be composed and they can communicate, for which PRISM uses the composition operators from the process algebra CSP (e.g., see [23] 
From STPS Models to PRISM Programs
We encode an STPS model into an equivalent PRISM program. We chose Markov Decision Processes as the PRISM formalism because they conform better to the STPS semantics given by the transition rules defined in Section 3.
The encoding is specified by five functions, namely Ψ A , Ψ O , Ψ L , Ψ I and Ψ C . Given an STPS model S ∈ S (S is the set of STPS models) they return a PRISM program P ∈ P (P is the set of PRISM programs).
Specifically, each function maps a fragment of the STPS model into a PRISM module. Function Ψ A encodes the actors and the transition rules that have an effect on them. Ψ O encodes the objects and the transition rules that have an effect on objects. Ψ L encodes the physical space, locations and doors, and the transition rules affecting them. These three functions together encode the structure which links actors, objects, locations and doors and the changes that operate on them by the STPS transition rules.
Besides, Ψ I encodes the intruder and the transition rules of the intruder's actions, and Ψ C encodes the transition costs. The final PRISM program is the composition, by synchronization, of the five modules.
Our mapping models locations l ∈ L as integers and assumes the set of PRISM variables given in Table 6 . 
The rule's conclusion, its part concerning the actor, is empty so it maps to the neutral update l ′ a = i, which changes nothing. The mapping concerning the part of the rule's conclusion that relates to the change of status of the door, from unlocked to locked, is specified in Ψ L .
In Listing 1 we use the function ♦ that adds a boolean to the guard of a command, for example:
. This is used for the commands related to the guarded and probabilistic choices (line 16 and line 17, respectively).
O t h e r w i s e i n end Listing 1: Generating the Actors Modules.
The function Ψ O shown in Listing 2 generates the commands of the objects modules. These commands express the objects' behaviours described in the conclusions of STA rules. The variable l o is of type integer describing the location of the object o that is initialised by its first location and x o is a boolean expressing the existence of the object o. Also, the boolean o o ′ expresses the ownership of the object o ′ by the container o. All commands generated by Ψ O synchronize with the similar ones obtained by Ψ A .
Listing 2: Generating the Objects Modules.
The function Ψ L presented in Listing 3 produces the PRISM commands related to the status of doors.
The boolean proposition C d i j shows if the door d i j between locations i and j is locked or not.
Listing 3: Generating the Objects Modules.
The function Ψ C defined in Listing 4 produces the cost commands by calling the function Cost. The command in line 3 is a generic command that returns the cost related to the action α where g α is the guard to execute α.
Listing 4: Generating the Costs Modules.
Security Properties
Since the scope of our formalization is to verify socio-technical security properties on STPS models, we comment in this section what properties can be of relevance and how to express them in such a way that they can be checked by running PRISM. A formalism that is able to express all the factors that our STPS models describe, that is paths along locations, paths of actions, propositions on state variables, probabilities of occurrence of events and of sequences of events, and their costs is the extended PCTL [10] . Formulas φ in such a logic are generated by the following BNF grammar:
, and ⊲⊳∈ {<, ≤, >, ≥}. A state formula can be "ap", an atomic proposition, or any propositional expression built from "ap". P ⊲⊳ p [ψ], called probabilistic path predicate, returns true if the probability to satisfy the path formula ψ is ⊲⊳ p. The cost predicate R ⊲⊳r [φ ] returns true if the cost to satisfy φ is ⊲⊳ r. Here, F is the temporal logic operator eventually. A path formula is built from the typical temporal operators next (X), until (U), and bounded until (U ≤ k ). As usual, other logic operators can be derived from the basic operators. Namely:
•
Besides, the extended PCTL has two more probabilistic operators, Pmin and Pmax, and two more cost operators, Rmin and Rmax. These operators can be used within a path or a state formulas to express the minimum (resp. maximum) probability or cost.
In order to simplify the specification of STPS requirements, we define three PCTL expression templates. Assuming that σ is a predicate logic expression built from three atomic propositions, namely:
(a o ) (i.e., agents a holds object o), (l a = i) (i.e., agent a is in location i), and (l o = i) (i.e., object o is in location i), we define:
Using the templates we can express reachability properties in a socio-technical sense, such as the property that eventually an object is found in a location, that an actor, or the intruder, reaches a room, or that he will get in possession of an object. They can be used to check for possibility of intrusions or of thefts. The quantitative expressions φ ′ and φ ′′ are used to quantify, in term of minimal cost and maximum probability, a security property. We show how to use such properties in the next section where we develop a proof-of-concept use case.
Case Study
Let 'E' be the name of a building in a small institution. At lunch time, the 'E' building's workers leave their office doors open or closed, but without locking them. There are no policies or security primitives that enforce them to lock doors and to prevent security incidents from insiders. Further, the 'E' building has two gates to enter or exit, which are always open from 6 am to 6 pm. During this time, no access card/key is needed to enter the building. Under these assumptions, we use our framework to measure the probability and the cost to get access to an unauthorized location and to steal objects by an intruder. The building's infrastructure is depicted in Figure 2 . It has nine locations, labeled l 0 , · · · , l 8 
Formal Model
First, we develop the infrastructure tree, and we describe the behavior of an actor a. Then, we show the generated PRISM code for the actor, the intruder, and the objects. Figure 3 captures part of the graph model of the infrastructure shown in Figure 2 . It shows the initial values of the actor a, the intruder I, and the objects o 1 and o 2 . The behavior of a is expressed as follows: 
PRISM Model
For the performance assessment of the system, the whole system is encoded into PRISM; and Listing 5 shows the code fragment for the actor a, the intruder I, both objects o 1 and o 2 , and the cost module.
In Listing 5, the module "Actor a " (lines 25-40) describes the behavior of the actor a and the module "Intruder" (lines 3-23) describes the behavior of the intruder. To add more actors, a user instantiates the module "Actor a " by renaming only the actor's local variables. Also, the modules "Object o 1 " (lines 41-47) and "Object o 2 " (lines 48-54) describe the behaviours of objects "o 1 " and "o 2 ", respectively. The module "Cost" (lines 55-60) assigns the cost to the actions. In the module "Intruder", the probabilistic command in line 7 defines the behavior of the intruder when he is outside the building and the set of commands in lines 9-14 describe the possible moving actions when he is in the location l 4 . In addition, lines [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] define two actions, take and put an object, respectively. For the objects o1 and o2, the commands in lines 43, 44, 50, and 51 describe the moving of objects, otherwise they stay at the same locations (lines 45, 46, 52, and 53). Finally, the module "cost" defines the cost to access to location l 2 (line 57), to possess an object (lines 58 and 59 ) by a possessor, and the cost to possess an object by the intruder. Otherwise, the cost in line 56 attributes the value 1 to any other action. 
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Listing 5: The PRISM Code Fragment of the System. 
Specification and Verification of Properties
In order to validate the functionality of the specified system, we verify four security properties, which are instantiations of the templates developed in Section 4.3.
Property 1.
"What is the maximum probability for the intruder I to possess both objects o 1 and o 2 ?" This property is instantiated from φ ′′ and expressed as follows:
The variable step is the number of steps to reach the state that satisfies: Figure 4 . It shows the convergence of the probability evaluation of Property 1 from 0 at step 11 to 0.026 after 28 steps, then it increases up to 1 after 50 steps.
This result shows that the opportunity to steal an object is increasing while the intruder is in the building. Figure 5 shows that the cost obtained from the satisfiability of Property 2 is 9 from locations l 4 and l 6 , and 3 from locations l 2 and l 3 , and 4 from l 7 and l 8 . From this result, we observe that the cost increases more when the intruder is far from the object location. The verification results depicted in Figure 6 show that the reward obtained from the satisfiability of Property 3 is 240 for locations l 2 , · · · , l 7 , 24 for l 1 , and 0 for l 0 and l 8 . The obtained results show the highest cost needed to possess an object and going outside the building from a given location. Figure 7 shows that the probability results of this property converges to 1 after 55 steps. We observe that the probability to possess an object is close to one for both the actor and intruder, since they stay at the building.
Conclusion
We have defined a framework for automatic security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Our formalism models aspects of a socio-technical physical space such as its spatial infrastructure, its objects -among which doors, locking keys, containers and assets-, and agents that move across the infrastructure and manipulate objects. Actions have a cost and decisions are guided by probabilities or by contextual conditions. The semantics is rich and allows to express security properties about whether attacks exist with maximal likelihood and minimal cost. These security properties can be verified automatically. We map our model to the specification language of the probabilistic model checker PRISM, and express our security properties in the Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic, which can be processed by PRISM.
The effectiveness and efficiency of our approach is illustrated with a simple case study.
The work done has been conceived to allow several further developments. We plan to extend our model with information, allowing for the modeling of digital objects and knowledge. This would make our model richer, able to express socio-technical physical and information systems. Our notion of intruder will be also extended with capabilities mirroring actions documented in social-engineering and incidents reports. Further, we plan to develop a security policy language, in order to enrich our framework with security policies. From a more theoretical point of view, we plan to develop correctness and soundness proofs of our mapping functions. Finally, we intend to implement the framework as a software tool that fully supports all steps in the design and analysis of socio-technical physical systems.
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